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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THALDA L. BAKER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case

ARCHIBALD H. COOK and

No. 8550

MAYH. COOK,

Defendants and Appellants.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant in her brief has made a statement of
facts which is held to be sufficient for the purpose of this
appeal, generally speaking. However, in the discussion
which follows of the various points herein, we have marshalled pertinent facts in the nature of a supplement to
appellant's statement. To avoid unnecessary repetition
these facts are not set out under this heading.
1
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
FINDINGS OF LOSS OF EARNINGS.
POINT TWO
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS ONE TO FOUR
INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY, AND THE DEFENDANT, HAVING FAILED TO MAKE ANY
TIMELY EXCEPTION THERETO, CANNOT
NOW COMPLAIN.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S
ANSWER TO PROPOSITIONS TWO AND
FOUR WAS NOT ERRONEOUS.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY
THE DEFENDANT'S THEOR.Y OF THE
CASE.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE
JURY AFTER THEY HAD RETURNED
THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO.
FI\tE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
2
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
FINDINGS OF LOSS OF EARNINGS.
As a result of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff
on August 20, 1953, it was necessary for her to have two
operations on her back. ( R. 56, 57, 65) The first operation was performed on October 20, 1953 and consisted of
doing what is known as a lamenectomy. (R. 57) The second operation was performed on December 16, 1954
(R. 59) and consisted of a fusion of the spine. (R. 63) Dr.
Burke M. Snow, the orthopedic surgeon that operated on
the plaintiff, testified that this type of surgery was very
painful and that it usually takes approximately three
months following the surgery before light work can be
done and from six months to a year before heavy work
can be done. (R. 71) The doctor further testified that the
plaintiff, as a result of the injury and resulting operations
suffered a 20 per cent permanent partial disability. The
plaintiff testified that she was unable to even do her
housework from the period from the date of the injuries,
August 20, 1953, to her first operation (R. 39), and that
between the t-\vo operations, October 20, 1953, and December 16, 1954, she was not able to do any work of any
kind. (R. 41) The plaintiff further testified that at the
time of the trial she was still having difficulties with pain
and numbness in her back and legs, which restricts her
working ability, and requires her to wear a metal brace
3
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on her back all the time, except when she
(R. 42, 43)

IS

in bed.

The plaintiff testified at length about her employment
record and the type of work she had done, commencing
with her first job in 1938 up to the time of her injury.
(R. 13, 21) This testimony revealed that although the
plaintiff had a variety of jobs, she had been fairly continuously employed from 1942 (R. 14, 15) up to the time
of the injury. In order to establish a basis for an award
to the plaintiff for the loss of earnings that she has suffered as a result of her injuries and operations, the plaintiff testified that her average annual income for the three
years preceding her injuries was about $2300.00 a year.
( R. 12, 23) This evidence is, of course, entirely proper
and frequently used as a basis for such an award. See 15
Am. Jur. 500.
Defendant contends that ''in view of her own statements as to having been unemployed for three months
preceding the accident, such yearly income figures are
without probative value as to her loss of income since the
accident.'' This would seem to imply that unless a person has been continuously employed, no loss of earnings
\vould ever be proved. This, of course, is not the law. In
the case of Mobley v. Garcia, (N. 11.) 217 Pae. (2d) 256,
the court sustained an a "Tard for loss of earnings to the
plaintiff, although she 'vas not working at the time of the
injury, having temporarily quit her employment for personal reasons. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not so testify. She testified that her last steady work prior to her
injuries had been at the Master Cleaners and that she
4
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left there 1\iay 30, 1953, but that she did housework for
various people following her employment at the Master
Cleaners up to August 20, 1953, the date of the injury. In
fact, she had placed an ad in the paper to obtain more
work (R. 97)
Defendant cites only two cases under her Point No. 1,
both Utah cases, which state that if a finding is so plainly
unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting
fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it cannot
stand. It is submitted that the evidence of plaintiff's history of her varied, yet continuous employment for many
years, the severe nature of her injuries, and her testimony
of her annual average income for three years before the
injury, clearly provide substantial evidence to support the
award of $2500.00 for loss of earnings from August 20,
1953, to March 28, 1956, the date of the trial.
POINT TWO
rrHE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS ONE TO FOUR
INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY, AND THE DEFENDANT, HAVING FAILED TO MAKE ANY
TIMELY EXCEPTION THERETO, CANNOT
NOW COMPLAIN.
This Court has held in the case of Cooper v. Evans,
262 Pac. (2d) 278, 1 Ut. 2d 68, that Rule 51 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which require that an
objection to instructions be made or no error thereon
may be assigned applies also to special interrogatories. In that case the court did consider the interrogatory, although no objection had been made, because it was found that the complaining party did
5
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not waive her objection as she had been afforded
:rio opportunity to object to the interrogatory. In the
present case the defendant did have such an opportunity
to object and did not make any objection of any kind concerning the error claimed in appellants' Point Two. Prior
to instructions from the court, and arguments of counsel,
counsel for both sides agreed to take their exceptions
after the jury had retired. (R. 171) Mr. Rex Hanson,
counsel for the defendants, took a general exception to
the court's submitting "the issue of the defendant's negligence to the jury under the special verdict,' but he did
not except in any way to the form or wording of the special verdict, nor did he specifically except to Proposition
No.1. (R. 178)
In Dimick v. Utah Fuel Co., 164 Pac. 872, 49 Ut.
430, this court held that where an exception is taken
to only a portion of an instruction, the court on appeal
cannot consider complaints of other portions thereof.
The reasons for the requirement, that a timely and
sufficient objection be taken to the court's charge, are
stated in the case of Marks v. Thompson, 27 Pac. 6,
7 Ut. 421, and Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co.
v. Allen Oil Co. (Utah) 258 Pac. (2d) 445. This court
there said that exceptions should be made and pointed out
before the verdict of the jury is reached, so that the judge
may have an opportunity to correct any errors which he
may have inadvertently fallen into during the hearing
and perplexitities of the trial and that the objection
should be specific enough to give the trial court notice of
every error in the instruction which is complained of
on appeal.
6
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The rule that if no exception is taken to the giving
of instructions, no error can be assigned thereon, has been
repeatedly stated by this court. See Hadra v. Utah Nat'l
Bank, 35 Pac. 508, 9 Ut. 412, Dimick v. Utah Fuel Co.,
supra, Morgan, v. Child, Cole t:t Co., 213 Pac. 177, 61 Ut.
448; Straka v. Voyles, 252 Pa.c. 667, 69 Ut. 123; Schubach v. American Surety Co. of New York, 273 Pac.
974, 73 U t. 332. Although these cases all involve
alleged error in instructions the court has indicated that
the same rules would apply to special verdicts. See
Cooper v. Evans, supra. The only exception to this rule,
requiring a timely and sufficient objection, is where there
exists in the case sure persuasive reason which invokes
the discretion of the court to extricate a person from a
situation where some gross injustice or inequity would
otherwise result. See McCall v. Kendrick, 274 Pac. (2_d)
962, 2 U t. 2d 364, where this court recited this exception
and stated that the burden of showing special circumstances which would warrant a departure from the
rules rests upon the party seeking to vary it. It is
submitted that the appellant herein has not met this
burden in any manner. The special v~rdict form and
wording of the special verdict were acceptable to
the appellant at the time they were given and did
not become unacceptable until it was determined that
she was the losing party. If it was unacceptable to the
appellant at the time and she believed that it was improper, it would seem that her silence and failure to
object was for the purpose of having reversible error in
the record as insurance against defeat. In either event,
it wuld be unjust and inequitable to the plaintiff respqnd7
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ent to permit the appellant to complain for the first time
on appeal. See also 89 C. J. S. 347.
Assuming merely for the sake of argument that
appellant has a right on appeal to complain about the
special verdict on the two grounds set forth in her Point
Two, it is submitted that there was no prejudicial error
in the special verdict to justify a reversal. As to a ppellants' ground one, that Proposition 1 of the special verdict, as drawn, assumed facts in dispute, it is submitted
that as the propositions called for a true or false answer,
it was inevitable to assume facts in order to put forth
this type of proposition. It must be admitted that Proposition No. 1 combined two questions of fact: (1) whether
or not the defendants furnished a defective ladder and
(2) whether or not the defendants were negligent in so
furnishing a defective ladder. The jury found that both
were true. The language of Proposition 1 is clear and
concise and obviously requires such a conclusion.
In 53 Am. Jur. at page 757 it is said:
''A special verdict should be construed reasonably
and fairly, ·w·ithout heed to slight defects and
subtle and refined distinctions .... If taken as a
whole, a finding legitimately supports the judgment, it V\rill be upheld. However, the law favors
special verdicts and \Yill sustain them whenever
it can be done consistently \Yith the rules by
"'hich they are governed.''
As stated in Cooper Y. Evans, supra, the interrogatories are to be understood in light of the instructions.
The court in its instructions No. 10 and 11 carefully and
properly defined negligence and the duties of the defendants in this ease. Vie'\\ring Proposition No. 1 in light of
8
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these instructions, it appears that the jury was fully informed and advised so that they could and did properly
answer Proposition No. 1, which found that the defendants furnished a defective ladder to the plaintiff and were
negligent in so doing.
The appellant relies on several Wisconsin cases to
support her contention that the wording of Proposition
No. 1 assumes facts in dispute. The leading case cited by
appellant, Maas v. W. R. Arthur & Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2
N. W. (2d) 238, was a case where the court inquired of the
jury whether the defendant was negligent (a) in attempting to overtake and pass the car ... at the intersection.
This question called for a yes or no answer and was not
an affirmative statement calling for a true or false answer
as was the Proposition No.1 submitted in this case. The
Court held that the form of the question assumed the car
was passing at the intersection was improper. The Court
did not say that this was erroneous as amounting to a
comment on the evidence, as stated in the appellants'
brief, but did say that the question should have read
"Was the driver negligent in respect to passing at an
intersection.''
In Hoffman v. Heinke,. 268 Wis. 489, 67 N.W. (2d)
871, the statement on the question was dictum, because the
appellant had not properly preserved the question raised
by motions after the verdict. The Foemnel v. Mueller
case, 255 Wis. 277, 38 N. W. (2d) 510, is another case
where the court ,as in the Maas case, supra, asked the
jury for a yes or no answer; and according to the court,
assumed by the form of the question the ultimate fact.
The court stated that the lower court ''should have sub9
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mitted the direct question whether 'Mueller was negligent
in stopping without placing such fuses or flares' and 'the
direct question whether Mueller was negligent in failing
to have clearance lights burning.' ''
The appellant further complains that the real issue
was not submitted to the jury, namely, whether the ladder introduced in evidence was the ladder used by plaintiff. It is submitted that this was not an ultimate issue
at all, and that the only ultimate issues as far as the defendant was concerned were whether the defendant
negligently furnished a defective or suitable ladder to
the plaintiff. This was placed in direct consideration by
Proposition No. 1.
As to defendant's second ground for obpjection to
the four propositions, namely, that as drawn, the propo·
sitions enable the jury to evade their duty and still return
answers to the questions, it is respectfully submitted that
this is not at all the case. The trial judge in this case
has done considerable pioneer work in this state in the
use of special interrogatories and special verdicts.
He has developed this third possible answer as a
means to remove some of the problems and perplexities that face juries in deciding ultimate questions
of fact. The court's Instruction No. 10 advised the
jury that ''unless such negligence is established by a preponderence of all of the evidence, you cannot find that it
exists. The answer made was clearly intended to show
a finding of a failure to prove the fact by the party
having the burden thereon. It was so understood by court
and counsel, and once again we point out that no timely
10
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objection was made to such form of answer by appellant.
All of the four propositions had the same three possible
answers: true, false or unable to say. Thus the appellant
was not prejudiced nor the respondent favored thereby.
Under the court's instructions, the answer, "unable to
say," did decide the issues and did constitute a finding
sufficient to enable the court to properly render a judgment thereon.

POINT THREE
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S
ANSWER TO PROPOSITIONS TWO AND
FOUR WAS NOT ERRONEOUS.
The special verdict submitted by the court to the
jury as pointed out heretofore, provided that they could
give one of three answers to each of the four propositions-True, False, or Unable to Say. The appellant was
fully aware of the interpretation which the court intended
to give to the answer "unable to say," namely, that the
party having the burden of proof on the proposition so
answered, had failed to sustain such burden and yet the
appellant did not make any objection or exception to the
submission of the special verdict in this manner until the
jury had answered the propositions in a manner unfavorable to the appellant. As pointed out in respondent's
Point II, the law requires that timely, sufficient exception
be made to a special verdict the same as required to the
court's instructions in order that an appeal can be taken
thereon. See Cooper v. Evans, supra. The authorities
cited in Point II, showing the necessity for a timely, suffi11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cient exception to a special verdict are also controlling
here.
Assuming that the appellant had made a timely,
proper exception to the answers provided for in the special verdict, it is respectfully submitted that the court's
submission to the jury of the propositions with the third
alternative answer of "unable to say" was not error. As
admitted by the appellant, the weight of authority in this
country is that when a jury answers an interrogatory as
they did to Propositions Two and Four in this case, that
the court finds, as was done in this case, that the party
having the burden on the proposition submitted had
failed to sustain the same. The authorities that so hold
do so even when the jury is directed to return a true or
false, or yes or no, answer to the proposition. See 53 Am.
Jur. 748, Sec. 1079; 89 C. J. S. 315, Sec. 559, and 76 A.L.R.
1145.
It should be pointed out and clearly understood
that the appellant's contention in her Point No.3 is misleading and incorrect. The appellant contends that the
jury failed to answer Propositions Two and Four. This
was not the case, of course, for the jury answered these
propositions "\vith the third alternative answer provided
by the court. They answered that they '""ere unable to
say that the affirmative propositions submitted were true
or false. In other 'vords that there had not been sufficient evidence presented in the case vrhich afforded them
a basis for saying that it was true that plaintiff vras contributorily negligent and that such negligence proximately caused her InJUries or that it was false. The

12
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court's instruction No. 2 advised the jury upon the
burden of proving negligence and contributory negligence
and the effect of a failure to sustain this burden. This
answer was clearly proper and in conformity with the law.
The appellant claims that courts in Texas have uniformly held in accord v,rith her contention in Point No. 3
and cities certain cases. In all of these cases the court
in its charge categorically directed the jury to return a
yes or no answer to the questions. In all of these cases,
except Goggan v. Wells Fargo & Co. (C. C. A. Tex. 1920)
227 S. W. 246, the jury reported that they were unable
to agree on an answer, or else failed to make any answer.
The other few cases cited by appellant were also cases
where the court directed an affirmative or negative
answer and the jury could not agree. As acknowledged
by appellant these cases represent a minority view of
even the situation where the jury fails to agree or does
not answer. It is respectfully submitted that they are not
in point and are no authority for the situation found in
this case where the jury agrees on an answer authorized
by the court in its charge.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE
CASE.
Appellant contends that plaintiff's injuries were due
solely to her own negligence. Appellant admits that she
does not have any knowledge as to what plaintiff's negligence consisted of and, of course, there was no evidence

13
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in the trial of any specific negligent conduct by the plaintiff. It is submitted that the issue of negligence raised
by the evidence was whether the defendant negligently
furnished plaintiff a defective ladder with which to perform her work and if so was this a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. The appellant denied furnishing
such a defective ladder and asserted that the plaintiff
was herself negligent which caused in whole or
in part her injuries. There was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff" slipped and fell" from the ladder
or that "she failed to set the ladder up properly and it
tipped over,'' thus no instructions or interrogatories
could have been submitted on such contentions or
theories.
Appellant contends that the court should have sub~
mitted interrogatories to the jury as requested in her
requested Instruction No. 2, namely, as to whether the
ladder introduced in evidence (defendant's Exhibit 24)
was the ladder used by the plaintiff; and if it was, whether
it collapsed. It is submitted that these are not ultimate
facts, but are evidentiary facts, which if submitted would
merely require the jury to give their views on the evidence. Such questions would not be proper. See 53 Am.
Jur. 743, Section 1072 and 89 C. J. S. 247, Sec. 532. The
ultimate fact was not what ladder 'Yas used and did a
certain one collapse, but was the ladder furnished defective and did this defective condition cause the plaintiff's
injuries. If these facts nre found, together 'vith the fact
that the defendant knew or should have known of the
defective coindition, then the defendant could be responsible for any injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result
14
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thereof, unless she was contributorily negligent. Propositions One and Three properly submitted these ultimate
facts to the jury and their answer resolved these facts
in favor of the plaintiff.
It is unquestionably the law as quoted by the appellant, that it is the duty of the trial court to cover the
theories of both parties in his instructions, provided,
of course, that the theories have been properly raised by
the pleadings and the evidence. It is respectfully submitted that the court's instructions No. 11 and 12, together with the propositions propounded in the special
verdict, adequately and properly covered the issues in
this case and the theories of the parties which were supported by the evidence.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE
JURY AFTER THEY HAD RETURNED
THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO.
FIVE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The defendant claims that the trial court "by adroit
cross-questioning led the jurors,'' and by commenting on
questions which counsel for the defendant wished to have
asked, the court nullified the effect of such questions before asking them, thereby making ''the result a foregone
conclusion." This implication, that the trial court favored
the plaintiff over the defendant and in effect maneuvered
and led the jury into giving the plaintiff a verdict, is
false and completely untrue.
The defendant points to certain questions of the
court to the jury found on pages 186 to 192 of the rec-
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ord. This portion of the record c.overed proceedings
after the jury had returned from answering all of the
propositions, including No. 5 on damages. In order to
get the complete picture of the court's absolute fairness
and impartiality in his questioning of the jury it is
necessary to examine the record on pages 181 to 185 as
well as 186 to 192, the pages pointed out by the defendant. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the court's
question to the jury as to whether there was a prepond .
erance of the evidence on the question of plaintiff's con·
tributory negligence, so that they could answer true or
false to Proposition Two, was absolutely fair and completely clear. (R. 182 and 183)
In effort to nullify the findings in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant's counsel objected to the court's
interpretation of the jury's answer to Proposition two,
namely, that they were unable to say from the evidence
whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Defense counsel suggested that this answer did
not necessarily indicate that the jury found that the defendant had not sustained her burden of proof, but that
it might mean that they did not understand the wording
of the question. It is submitted that from the court's
prior questioning and the jury's answers thereto, no
such contention was justified. (R. 181, 182, 183) Despite
the remoteness of any possibility that defendant's contention was justified, the Court to be absolutely fair and
careful, proceeded to question the jurors again concerning this remote possibility, on their return from
ans,vering Proposition No. 5 relative to damages. It is to
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this portion of the court's questioning that defense
counsel takes exception.
It is respectfully submitted that an examination of
the trial court's questions to the jury (R. 181, 192)
clearly shows that the court was careful, prudent, fair
and impartial. The court has, in its discretion, the right
to examine the jury on its answers to a special verdict.
See 53 Am. Jur. 739, Sec. 1067. This practice is proper
with or without the consent of the parties, provided that
it is done with caution.
Defendant complains that by commenting on questions "\vhich counsel for the defendant wished to have
asked, the Court nullified the effect of such questions before asking them. (R. 190) It is respectfully submitted
that this was not the case. Written answers to interrogatories cannot be modified by oral answers to questions
put to the jury by the Court, nor is the Court bound to
receive every fact which the jurors desire to state, 53
Am. Jur. 739, Section 1067. Thus the Court was entirely
in order in limiting the jurors' comments to the question
which he put to them.
The careful impartiality of the trial judge is also
clearly apparent at page 180 of the record where he
answered the jury's question concerning the legal effect
of certain answers to the propositions presented to them.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff in conclusion earnestly submits that
the judgment of the District Court was lawful and proper
for the following reasons.
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One: There is sufficient competent evidence to support the jury's finding of loss of earnings.
Two: The Cou.rt did not err in submitting Propositions One to Four, inclusive, to the jury and the defendant having failed to make any timely exception, thereto,
cannot now complain.
Three: The Court's ruling on the jury's answer to
Propositions Two and Four was not erroneous and the
appellant because of her failure to make a timely objection to the special verdict cannot now complain.
Four: The Court did not err in failing to submit the
defendant's theory of the case as set forth in defendant
Point IV.
Five: The Court's questioning of the jury after they
had returned their answer to Proposition No. 5 was not
error.
For the foregoing reasons, it is most respectfully
urged by the respondent that the judgment of the District Court entered on the jury's special \erdict be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WOODROW D. WHITE,
J\tiAS YANO

Attorneys for Respondent
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